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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] The explosion in consumer demand for wireless services that
began in the 1990s caught policymakers off guard. Demand for wireless
services has only accelerated, as new cellular wireless technologies-such
as broadband Internet via 3G and 4G LTE-permit services such as web
browsing, video streaming, the Internet of Things, and gaming,
necessitating a steady influx of spectrum as an input. However, the
traditional Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) spectrum
assignment processes, to nonfederal and federal users respectively,
strained to accommodate new demands and cutting-edge services. In
traditional assignment, still widely used today, the rights to free use of
certain frequencies are awarded by the FCC and NTIA to deserving users.'
* The author is a research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. He
has an economics degree from Wheaton College and a law degree from the George
Mason University School of Law. He extends thanks to Ted Bolema and two anonymous
reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and special thanks to Thomas Hazlett,
whose conversation precipitated this article.
1 See 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2012) (the FCC "shall determine, in the case of each
application filed with it ... whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will
be served by the granting of such application."); see also NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES FOR
FEDERAL RADIO FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT 8.1.1 (May 2013, rev. 2014),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/201 1/manual-regulations-and-procedures-federal-radio-
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Figuring out who is deserving of frequencies in the absence of the price
system, however, is a time-consuming and politicized process. Rent-
seeking and economic waste at the FCC became too obvious to ignore in
the 1990s, so regulators today increasingly rely on market allocation of
nonfederal spectrum through spectrum auctions.2
[2] The new challenge is transferring spectrum from inefficient legacy
operators to bandwidth-hungry entrants. Almost no "greenfield" spectrum
is left-commercial and government users occupy nearly all valuable
spectrum-so policymakers are scouring existing wireless systems for
surplus spectrum that can be auctioned. In the past 25 years, various
incumbent users, including television broadcasters, 3 public safety
agencies,4 aeronautical systems,5 and utility companies,6 have seen their
spectrum transferred to new licensees and repurposed for consumer uses
such as mobile broadband. Not only are inefficient commercial
technologies locked in because of decades of top-down spectrum
assignment, but also the growing consensus among experts is that
spectrum assigned to federal agencies is lightly used and would be better
'7redeployed for consumer use.
frequency-management-redbook, archived at https://perma.cc/LVU9-H7F9 (describing
NTIA's spectrum assignment procedures).
2 See Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did
FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529, 532-33 (1998).
3 See Robert M. Rast, The Dawn ofDigital TT, IEEE SPECTRUM (Oct. 3, 2005, 4:18 AM),
http://spectmm.ieee.org/consumer-electronics/audiovideo/the-dawn-of-digital-tv,
archived at https://perma.cc/Y2RF-K7PY (describing the clearing of analog broadcast
television systems to allow for the 700 MHz auction).
See infra Part B(1) (describing the PCS auction).
See Gregory L. Rosston, Increasing the Efficiency ofSpectrum Allocation, 45 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 221, 231 (2014).
6 See infra Part B(1) (describing the PCS auction).
7 President Barack Obama concurs with this assessment. In June 2010, he issued a
memorandum directing the NTIA to identify federal spectrum that can be made available
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[3] Slow repurposing of federal spectrum is a hidden public policy
crisis with tremendous economic costs. Delayed reassignment of spectrum
to efficient use is costly to society,8 so streamlining the process of quickly
transferring swaths of spectrum between users is a policy goal that would
yield significant economic benefits. Economists estimate that spectrum in
the hands of inefficient incumbents represents hundreds of billions of
dollars of lost consumer surplus annually. 9 Delayed deployment of new
for wireless broadband by 2020. See Unleashing the Wireless Broadband Revolution, 3
C.F.R. 348, 348-49 (2011); see also Thomas M. Lenard, Lawrence J. White & James L.
Riso, Increasing Spectrum for Broadband: What Are the Options? 23 (Tech. Pol'y Inst..
Working Paper, 2010), https://techpolicyinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/increasing-spectrum-for-broadb-200766 1.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/G8YV-NQBV ("There appears to be a widespread consensus that
spectrum in government hands is likely not being used efficiently . . . ."); Jeffrey A.
Eisenach, Spectrum Reallocation and the National Broadband Plan, 64 FED. COMM. L.J.
87, 130 (2011); Harvey J. Levin, The Radio Spectrum Resource, 11 J.L. & ECON. 433,
434 (1968) ("Most other users (like those in public safety and local or federal government
radio) are not directly constrained in their use of spectrum by pressures in any 'markets'
for their end products or services."); Kenneth R. Carter & J. Scott Marcus, Improving the
Effectiveness and Efficiency of Spectrum Use by the Public Sector: Lessons from Europe
(Sept. 27, 2009), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1488852, archived
at https://perma.cc/54M5-DJDD ("To a significant degree, these [efficiency]
improvements have not worked their way into spectrum use by public sector users,
including the military, emergency services, or aeronautical or maritime transport.");
James Losey & Sascha Meinrath, Free the Radio Spectrum, IEEE SPECTRUM (June 28,
2010, 7:59 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/wireless/free-the-radio-spectrum/0,
archived at https://perma.cc/TW26-NMXW (stating that "the 270 000 [assignments] held
by government agencies . .. are woefully underutilized.").
8 See COLEMAN BAZELON & GIULIA MCHENRY, LOCUSTPOINT NETWORKS, STAYING ON
TRACK: REALIZING THE BENEFITS FROM THE FCC's INCENTIVE AUCTION WITHOUT
DELAY ii (2015),
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view;ECFSSESSION=Kk3QJpkhFvcQwklx1G3Rz6tF
8p3LBhxBWphlZmjDp4nkr6OXTZRG! 156529071!809722108?id=60001031918,
archived at https://perma.cc/DU6R-D5Z5 (estimating that the social costs of delaying the
"Incentive Auction" of TV bands two or three years could approach $200 billion).
9 See, e.g., HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, HUDSON INST., GRANTING LICENSED SPECTRUM
FLEXIBILITY: HOW TO SPUR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INNOVATION IN AMERICA 6 (2012),
http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1084/hfr--
spectrumflexibility--dec l2.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/N4EN-VJB5; see also
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wireless services results chiefly because few incumbents offer to
relinquish their valuable spectrum. Incumbents generally have two
undesirable options: either (a) relocate to another band and purchase new,
more efficient equipment or (b) mothball operations completely.
[4] The spectrum shortage is not a market failure; rather, it is a
regulatory failure that prevents spectrum from being quickly transferred to
its highest-valued uses. First, although some commercial users pay market
rates for spectrum through auctions and secondary markets, federal
agencies do not pay market rates. 10 The negligible annual fee agencies pay
for their frequencies means spectrum is undervalued and agencies have
little incentive to economize. Second, because federal agencies cannot sell
or transfer their spectrum to commercial users, the resources are locked
into inefficient federal systems.
Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Mufloz, A Welfare Analysis ofSpectrum Allocation
Policies, 40 RAND J. OF ECON. 424, 425 (2009).
10 Agencies pay only a small, annual fee for their spectrum-$122 for each frequency
assignment. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-7, SPECTRUM
MANAGEMENT: INCENTIVES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND TESTING NEEDED TO ENHANCE
SPECTRUM SHARING 11 n. 14 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650019.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/3BRP-BVNT.
11 The Miscellaneous Receipts Act requires "an official or agent of the Government
receiving money for the Government from any source" to "deposit the money in the
Treasury as soon as practicable without deduction for any charge or claim." 31 U.S.C.
§ 3302(b) (2012). Thus, under current law, any payment to agencies would have to be
submitted to the Treasury rather than be retained by the agency receiving the payment for
relocation purposes. Once revenue is submitted to the Treasury, it may only be disbursed
pursuant to a specific congressional directive. See COMMERCE SPECTRUM MGMT.
ADVISORY COMM., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE PROCESS FOR IDENTIFYING
SPECTRUM FOR FUTURE REALLOCATION OR SHARING 25 n.55 (2008),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/081508_csmacwg3 report-revisedclea
n final.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/P872-TP5V.
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[5] To paraphrase FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel, federal
agencies need "carrots and sticks" for efficient use.12 In the next five to ten
years, particularly with the hardest-to-reclaim spectrum (such as that of
the Department of Defense), a "carrot" may be required. One "carrot"
proposal would encourage efficient trades by giving agencies greater
rights to the spectrum they possess-a system of transferable spectrum
13licenses 1 So that agencies can trade and sell spectrum to commercial
users and retain some of the proceeds.
[6] Commissioner Rosenworcel proposed that to affect these
transactions and to channel spectrum to its highest-valued uses, the FCC
and NTIA could auction off "overlay" licenses to commercial users. 14
Overlay licenses here mean flexible-use licenses to use a particular band
occupied by another licensee. Overlay licenses grant auction winners (1)
primary rights to any unused spectrum in the band, (2) secondary rights to
spectrum in the band that is being used by an incumbent, and (3) exclusive
12 One meritorious "stick" proposal is to charge agencies approximately the opportunity
cost of their spectrum, much like the United Kingdom does. Long-term spectrum fees
should be budgeted for as an operating expense so that agencies can sensibly weigh the
tradeoffs between acquiring spectrum and other inputs that further their agency mission.
This proposal resembles a "GSA for spectrum." See LENARD, WHITE, & RIso, supra note
7, at 26; see also Brent Skorup, Reclaiming Federal Spectrum: Proposals and
Recommendations, 15 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 90, 110-12 (2013). For a thoughtful
analysis on the merits of this proposal, see generally DOROTHY ROBYN, ECON. STUDIES
AT BROOKINGS, BUILDINGS AND BANDWIDTH: LESSONS FOR SPECTRUM POLICY FROM
FEDERAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 2 (2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/09/23_buildings bandwidt
h spectrumproperty/23_buildings bandwidth spectrumproperty, archived at
https://perma.cc/9QFS-4VBE.
13 My thanks are extended to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this term.
14 Comm'r Jessica Rosenworcel, Remarks at CTIA 2013-The Mobile Marketplace 4
(May 22, 2013), http://www.fcc.gov/document/commissioner-rosenworcels-speech-ctia-
2013, archived at https://perma.cc/5SYN-47JG ("So I propose we auction 2155-2180
MHz along with an additional right ... the exclusive right to negotiate with federal
incumbents [in the 1755-1780 MHz band].").
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rights to bargain with existing users occupying portions of the band.15
These licenses can be accompanied by a deadline for incumbent users to
move out of the band. 1 6 Before that deadline, overlay licensees must
protect existing users in the band, but they also reap rewards (such as
faster deployment of 4G LTE services) if they can convince the
incumbents to move or repack to another band.
[7] Purchasing an overlay license is akin to purchasing a city block of
real property that has a few tenants with unexpired leases. The existing
tenants have a superior possessory right to occupy the property, but they
may willingly abandon the property for a high-enough cash payment or
trade. The benefit of overlay licenses is that they create residual claimants
and encourage voluntary settlements between the incumbent user or
users-in this case, a federal agency-and the overlay auction winner. The
FCC previously executed successful overlay auctions on the nonfederal
side, and Rosenworcel called such auctions an "elegant solution" for a
band encumbered by federal users.17
[8] There are several policy alternatives for repurposing federal
spectrum. A White House-commissioned study focuses on the
deficiencies of these proposals, but largely avoids comparative
institutional analysis.18 For example, the study notes the overlay auction
process can be "extremely slow and cumbersome." 19 The analysis cannot
1 See Brent Skorup, Getting Away From GOSPLAN, 36 REG. 14, 18 (Winter 2013-
2014), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2014/1/regulation-
v36n4-7.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/4MAT-W7AH.
16 See id. at 18.
17 Rosenworcel, supra note 14, at 4.
"s See KAREN D. GORDON ET AL., IDA SCI. & TECH. POLICY INST., A REVIEW OF
APPROACHES TO SHARING OR RELINQUISHING AGENCY-ASSIGNED SPECTRUM 2 (2014),
https://www.ida.org/upload/stpi/pdfs/p5lO2final.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/FD24-
7HBA.
19 Id. at 54.
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end there, however. The important questions to be answered include (1)
are overlays slow and cumbersome compared to the available alternatives
and (2) which process is more likely to improve social welfare?
[9] Economist Ronald Coase pointed out that a policy should (as much
as possible) be compared with other real-world policy alternatives and
their economic effects.20 Here, as in many debates, all available policy
choices are costly. Regulators must consider how their rules influence
relocation decisions relative to other real-world alternatives. In this paper,
I make the case that private ordering through overlay auctions performs
admirably when compared to the regulation-intensive spectrum-sharing
regime recommended in the President's Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology (PCAST) report.2 1 By examining how overlay auctions
and sharing techniques have worked in practice, regulators have a better
understanding of the costs and benefits associated with spectrum policy
decisions.22
II. BACKGROUND
[10] Command-and-control spectrum allocation methods prevailed at
the FCC and NTIA for decades, drawing comparisons to the former Soviet
20 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960) ("A
better approach would seem to be to start our analysis with a situation approximating that
which actually exists, to examine the effects of a proposed policy change and to attempt
to decide whether the new situation would be, in total, better or worse than the original
one.").
21 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF GOVERNMENT-HELD SPECTRUM TO SPUR
ECONOMIC GROWTH ix (July 2012) [hereinafter PCAST],
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast spectrum report fina
1july_20_2012.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/T5J5-L6PU.
22 See Thomas W. Hazlett, Efficient Spectrum Reallocation with Hold-Ups and Without
Nirvana 31 (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 14-16),
http://iep.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/nirvana.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/QVF3-CWB5.
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Union's State Planning Committee, known as Gosplan, "which allocated
scarce resources by administrative fiat among factories and other
producers in the Soviet economy."2 3 Economists such as Ronald Coase
pointed out during this era that spectrum has many attributes of real
property, and that it might be more efficiently used by private users who
(1) internalize the benefits and costs of deploying the input and (2) can sell
it to parties who value it more.24 Market-based spectrum reform-if not
always practiced-essentially won the day both on the commercial side
and at the FCC since the early 1990s. Auctions are held for spectrum,
secondary markets permit license transfers to profit-maximizing firms, and
the FCC generally avoids prescribing which wireless services must be
provided. Therefore, scholars are increasingly focused on injecting market
reform into the reordering of federal spectrum,2 5 which the NTIA assigns
to agencies through command and control.
[11] The 3,200 MHz segment of spectrum spanning 300 MHz to 3,500
MHz is in high demand for both government and commercial users. This
range of frequencies, or similar approximations to it, represents the so-
called "beachfront spectrum" because it has optimal propagation
26characteristics for many popular wireless services. Lower frequencies in
this range permit transmissions over long distances, whereas higher
frequencies transmit shorter distances, but have a higher capacity for
transmitting things like web data and streaming video. National mobile
23 See Skorup, supra note 15, at 14.
24 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 25, 29-30 (2002) (citing the property rights and auctions framework as "the
standard economists' view"); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited
Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's
"Big Joke": An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 335, 532
(2001); Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy,
Tomorrow'sAnachronism, Taking the Next Step to Open Access Spectrum, 41 J.L. &
ECON. 765, 766 (1998).
25 See, e.g., Eisenach, supra note 7, at 89; LENARD, WHITE & RIso, supra note 7, at i.
26 See PCAST, supra note 21, at 141-42.
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broadband carriers-the primary purchasers of available spectrum-such
as Sprint and AT&T Mobility take a diversified approach. They acquire
both low and high bands so that they can provide both good regional
coverage (via low bands) and localized high capacity (via high bands).
[12] NTIA manages federal spectrum, and it estimated in 2012 that
federal operations use about 40 percent of the in-demand spectrum.27 Of
the 3,200 MHz of beachfront spectrum, NTIA is currently analyzing close
to 1,000 MHz to either share with or transfer to commercial users. 28 To
that end, in late 2014, the FCC auctioned off federal spectrum in the
AWS-3 auction. 2 9 The biggest bidders included AT&T Mobility, Verizon
Wireless, Dish Network, and T-Mobile. 30 The 50 MHz band of paired
spectrum (25 MHz of federal spectrum was paired with another nonfederal
25 MHz block) raised over $40 billion.31 Several empirical studies show
27 NTIA defined "high-value spectrum" as "spanning 225 MHz to 3,700 MHz." Mark.
Goldstein, Dir. Phys. Infrastructure Issues, Testimony before the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, Subcomm. on Commc'n & Tech., Spectrum Management: Federal
Government's Use of Spectrum and Preliminary Information on Spectrum Sharing 3
(Sept. 13, 2012) (transcript on file with U.S. Gov't Accountability Office) [hereinafter
Goldstein Testimony], http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648206.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/Z4EA-LRTM.
2 8 See PENNY PRITZKER & LAWRENCEE. STRICKLING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FIFTH
INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT ON THE TEN-YEAR PLAN AND TIMETABLE 6, table B-1
(2015),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_5thinterim-progress report on ten-
yeartimetableapril_2015.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/Z2YN-KXPW.
29 See id. at 3.
30 See Phil Goldstein, A WS-3 Auction Results: AT&TLeads with $18.2B, Verizon at
$10.4B, Dish at $1OB and T-Mobile at $1.8B, FIERCEWIRELESS (Jan. 30, 2015),
http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/aws-3-auction-results-att-leads-182b-verizon-104b-
dish- lOb-and-t-mobile- 1 8b/2015-01-30, archived at https://perma.cc/2Z73-C7FG.
31 The paired spectrum grossed $42.5 billion, and the unpaired 15 MHz of federal
spectrum grossed $2.43 billion. See George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Auction 97
and the Value ofSpectrum, PHOENIX CENTER 1, 2 (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.phoenix-
center.org/perspectives/Perspectivel5-02Final.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/2SUV-
CYX4.
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that the annual consumer surplus derived from wireless broadband
approximates the auction value of the underlying spectrum.32 Therefore,
the $40 billion paired block of AWS-3 spectrum (when deployed) will
provide about $40 billion worth of consumer surplus annually.
[13] Federal agencies are market participants for many indispensable
inputs but not, anomalously, for spectrum. Agencies compete with private
firms for supply of most inputs, such as labor, real estate, electricity,
automotive fleets, and office supplies. Spectrum, however, is given to
federal agencies very cheaply, and underused or excess spectrum cannot
be sold to commercial operators.33 Agency spectrum is removed from
market processes, and agencies have little economic incentive to use or
manage spectrum efficiently.34 With little sense of the opportunity costs of
the spectrum they use, agencies are largely exempt from economic
pressures to use more efficient radios, outsource wireless services to
32 See BAZELON & MCHENRY, supra note 8, at 9.
33 Agencies pay only a small, annual fee for their spectrum-$122 for each frequency
assignment. Goldstein Testimony, supra note 27, at 12 & n.13.
34 PCAST concluded that, "[flederal users currently have no incentives to improve the
efficiency with which they use their own spectrum allocation." PCAST, supra note 21, at
ix. Some of the inefficiency is undoubtedly to be expected. Any large organization has
bureaucratic friction, and federal agencies-particularly defense agencies-are especially
risk averse. A lack of transparency regarding federal uses of spectrum and the fragmented
authority over federal spectrum management certainly contributed to the government
failure. Transparency in spectrum use is generally unrewarded and is therefore
undersupplied. See HAROLD FELD & GREGORY ROSE, BREAKING THE LOGJAM: SOME
MODEST PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY, EFFICIENCY AND INNOVATION IN
PUBLIC SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT 6 (2010), http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-fed-
spectrum-transparency-whitepaper.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/8LNG-QB5G. The
fragmentation of authority over federal spectrum may unfortunately be intractable. A
1994 effort to consolidate Department of Defense spectrum management lasted only a
year because the chiefs of Army, Navy, Air Force, and intelligence organizations all
wanted to retain their own spectrum management office. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-NSIAD-97-13 1, DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS: FEDERAL FREQUENCY
SPECTRUM SALE COULD IMPAIR MILITARY OPERATIONS 15 (June 1997),
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97 13 1.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/86LG-F7JH.
10
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commercial operators, or substitute wireless communications with wired
communications.
[14] Market mechanisms for repurposing federal spectrum are currently
unavailable, so members of Congress and the executive branch rely mostly
on scrutiny from government audits and congressional hearings, which
have limited effectiveness.3 5 Policymakers understand the urgency, but the
Obama administration's June 2013 memorandum to federal agencies, like
the PCAST report that informed the memorandum, does little about the
underlying problem.3 6 On the issue of efficient use of federal spectrum,
the memorandum merely directs agencies to determine what spectrum
could potentially be made available for sharing or clearing and requests
that agencies "use the minimum spectrum reasonably necessary to most
effectively meet mission requirements." 3 7
[15] These sorts of requests have been around for decades. The problem
is not that a president has not asked for efficient use forcefully enough;
rather, the problem is that federal agencies face few economic tradeoffs. 3 8
35 The slow relocation of government systems leads to verbal haranguing of federal
administrators and to visible frustration. See Carl Franzen, Congress blasts military and
national telecom agency for not sharing wireless spectrum faster, VERGE (June 27,
2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/27/4470738/congress-house-wireless-spectrum-
hearing-june-2013, archived at https://perma.cc/L26N-GZ6P ("Do you [NTIA and
Department of Defense administrators] sit down and talk to each other? Why wouldn't
the two of you sit down and talk about it. Why am I even having to ask this question
again?") (quoting Rep. Eshoo).
36 See Presidential Memorandum on Expanding America's Leadership in Wireless
Innovation (June 14, 2013), 78 Fed. Reg. 37,431 (June 20, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/14/presidential-memorandum-
expanding-americas-leadership-wireless-innovatio, archived at https://perma.cc/AMD 3-
JGXZ.
3 7 Id. at 37,433.
38 See Federal Management ofRadio Spectrum: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 10 (1995) (statement of
James L. Gattuso, Vice President, Citizens for a Sound Economy).
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Agencies have acceded-slowly-to congressional mandates to clear
spectrum for auction. However, agencies are increasingly resistant to
relocating their operations. 3 For this reason, the White House is
contemplating several spectrum-clearing and spectrum-sharing methods,
though no alternative has emerged as the consensus.40
III. RIVAL APPROACHES
[16] Repurposing federal spectrum is a pressing economic problem that
has received increasing attention. Several solutions have been proposed. A
2014 study commissioned by the White House found, every federal
spectrum-repurposing proposal, including overlays, faces implementation
challenges. 4 1 Comparisons between policies are therefore necessary for
informed policymaking. Below, the PCAST dynamic sharing proposal is
analyzed and compared to recent overlay auctions and the clearing of
federal users.
A. PCAST's Dynamic Sharing Proposal
[17] The political difficulties in transferring a valuable resource from
one group (federal agencies) to another (commercial wireless operators
and consumer device makers) guided the PCAST recommendation to do
away with traditional clearing and auctioning procedures such as
overlays.42 Instead, PCAST recommended simply changing the nature of
the obligations of spectrum users-a do-no-harm standard-and relying
on the future advancement of technologies that enable dynamic spectrum
39 See PCAST, supra note 21, at 9 (discussing the increasing difficulties of relocating
incumbent federal systems).
40 See Gordon et al., supra note 18, at 61.
41 See id. at 13 (noting the significant challenges implementing, for example, spectrum
use fees).
42 See PCAST, supra note 21, at 1 ("Clearing and reallocation of Federal spectrum for
exclusive use is not a sustainable basis for spectrum policy.").
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sharing. 43 With dynamic sharing, commercial devices such as
smartphones, tablets, and small cells detect and avoid-possibly in real
time-interference with federal systems, such as radar and video
surveillance, that use the same frequencies at the same time in the same
geographic area. The benefit is that dynamic sharing eliminates the need to
clear resistant federal users.
[18] The PCAST recommendations are modeled on the FCC's TV
white spaces proceeding. 4 That permitted unlicensed devices and
cognitive radios in the unused "white spaces" that comprise about 240
MVUlz of the 294 MVUlz allocated to television broadcasters.4 5 Like federal
users, television broadcasters are legacy users that, generally speaking,46cannot sell their spectrum to mobile carriers. After a 2002 staff
recommendation for this type of spectrum sharing, the FCC issued a 2008
order allocating spectrum for white space devices' use. The first device
was approved in 2012.47 White space devices must protect incumbent
broadcasters but can transmit and receive signals in geographic areas and
on frequencies that do not contain television broadcasters.
43 See id. at 11 ("T]he key to the new architecture is to create very wide bands and
implement dynamic, real-time, spectrum sharing.").
See id. at 24 ("We envisage that access to large Federal bands authorized for shared use
can be coordinated primarily by registering and communicating with a management
database, similar in concept to the White Space Databases certified by the FCC to
provide permission to transmit in the TV Bands.").
See Thomas W. Hazlett & Evan T. Leo, The Case for Liberal Spectrum Licenses: A
Technical and Economic Perspective, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1037, 1049 n.50 (2011)
(explaining the strict rules for unlicensed devices mean much of the available frequencies
cannot be exploited).
46 See PCAST, supra note 21, at 16.
4 See id. at 11-13.
13
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[19] The device specifications formulated by the FCC have strict power
limits and are quite complex because of interference concerns. 4 8 White
space-sharing techniques rely on accurate geolocation information; yet
those crucial databases of registered devices contain hundreds of errors.4 9
Seven years after the 2008 order, white space-sharing technology has
been used only marginally. As of this writing, only about 600 devices are
50in use, providing data services (e.g., connecting municipal water-
monitoring systems) and Wi-Fi-like Internet access (at a handful of
libraries and schools).
B. Auction of Overlay Licenses
[20] An alternative proposal for spectrum reform (resembling
Commissioner Rosenworcel's proposal) is to auction overlay licenses
which permit the commercial use of spectrum currently encumbered by
federal users. 52 These licenses are called overlays because they
4 See EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF PROTOTYPE TV-BAND WHITE SPACE
DEVICES PHASE II, OFFICE OF ENGINEERING & TECH., FCC/OET 08-TR-1005, iv (Oct. 14,
2008), http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/ document/view;
jsessionid=7qp3PlVbdnpcVyFWyS12N52n318pmkvNznfvhcyWdnPhqGTpyhzP! 147156
2840! -321460796?id=6520183093, archived at https://perma.cc/D2MJ-4C59.
4 See Robert McDowell, The FCC Should Fight for Our Right to TV White Space,
WIRED (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/fcc-white-spaces-database/,
archived at https://perma.cc/QQ6Y-GE9U; see also Mike Dano, FCC promises to clean
up error-ridden TV white space databases, FIERCEWIRELESS (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://www.fiercewireless.com/tech/story/ fcc-promises-clean-error-ridden-tv-white-
space-databases/2015-03-20, archived at https://perma.cc/2X27-C3B2.
50 See McDowell, supra note 49.
51 See Lyndsey Gilpin, White Space broadband: 10 communities doing big projects,
TECHREPUBLIC (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/white-space-
broadband- 10-communities-doing-big-projects/, archived at https://perma.cc/B8UR-
LTY5.
52 See RICHARD M. NUNNo, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SPR 97-218, RADIOFREQUENCY
SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT 23 (1998) (A wireless industry association opposed this
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geographically surround an existing spectrum assignment. Overlays have
enabled the relocation and clearing of state government systems and
public safety systems from a few hundred MVUlz of spectrum. Overlays
have not been used for federal spectrum because agencies cannot directly
- - -53receive consideration from commercial users.
[21] Overlay licenses grant auction winners (1) primary rights to any
unused spectrum in the band, (2) secondary rights to spectrum in the band
that is being used by an incumbent, and (3) exclusive rights to bargain
directly with existing users occupying portions of the band. In the case of
auctioning spectrum occupied by federal users, the winning overlay
licensee is required to protect the incumbent federal users but can
negotiate directly with them. Overlay licensees might induce incumbents
to use more efficient devices (thereby freeing up spectrum for new uses),
to tolerate certain amounts of interference, to move to a different band
entirely, or to cease operations altogether.5 4
[22] The policy innovation lies in combining transferable federal
spectrum rights with the overlay auction framework. These rights would
give agencies the ability to bargain with potential suitors and to be directly
compensated for vacating or otherwise reducing their use of a band.
Federal agencies are not profit-maximizing firms, but they do face budget
constraints, and tradeoffs are more transparent when agencies are faced
with priced assets. If permitted, agencies might improve their input mix by
proposal in the AWS-3 auction, but the crux of its opposition was that the federal users
were not required to relocate by a certain date).
53 See COMMENTS OF 4G AMERICAS IN THE MATTER OF AMENDMENT OF THE
COMMISSION'S RULES WITH REGARD TO COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS IN THE 1695-1710
MHz, 1755-1780 MHz, AND 2155-2180 MHz BANDS 8, GN DOCKET. No. 13-185 (2013),
http://www.hwglaw.com/siteFiles/News/3COFDOFD14FA23AEC2FC7013EO82AEB5.pd
f, archived at https://perma.cc/SQ5Q-X8DB.
Theoretically, overlay licensees could also bargain with incumbents to share spectrum
by the millisecond or by the hour, but it is unlikely, at present, that the economics of
spectrum sharing permit such agreements in practice.
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selling unused assets and reinvesting the revenue. For instance (as
described later) several agencies have transferable real property rights.
That is, they have the authority to lease and sell federal real estate and
buildings to private developers and to retain some of the proceeds.
Transferable spectrum rights make agencies residual claimants in a similar
fashion. Overlay auctions give regulators a process to induce spectrum
incumbents to sell their underused assets quickly.
[23] Although the compensation should be negotiated, successful
overlay auctions have featured a command-and-control element. As
explained infra, it is likely necessary for federal incumbents to have a
deadline to vacate their bands.56
1. Case Study of the PCS Auction
[24] Overlays have been used a few times to repurpose encumbered
nonfederal spectrum, including the major auctions like the PCS auction
and AWS-1 auction. Congress first authorized the FCC to conduct
spectrum auctions in 1993 to avoid wasteful command-and-control
prescriptions and to permit more spectrum for the nascent cellular phone
58industry. With that authority, the FCC used overlay auctions for the new
Broadband Personal Communications Service (PCS), a type of cellular
phone technology, in the mid-1990s. 5 9 The FCC auctioned 120 MVUlz of
5 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-574, DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE:
THE ENHANCED USE LEASE PROGRAM REQUIRES MANAGEMENT ATTENTION 1-2 (2011),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/320465.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/XKX6-7JFJ.
56 See Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel & John Williams, Efficient Relocation ofSpectrum
Incumbents, 41 J.L. & ECON. 647, 649 (1998) (Overlays, then, may not be appropriate for
bands where shutdown deadlines are especially unpredictable or long term).
57 See id. at 661.
58 See id. at 660.
59 See NUNNO, supra note 52, at 13 ("Overlay licenses were auctioned in the PCS
auctions since there were already incumbent licensees ... using that spectrum." The
auctioned spectrums were 1850-1910 MHz and 1930-1990 MHz. Id.
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encumbered beachfront spectrum, and cellular phone companies were the
major bidders. Incumbent users were mostly public utilities, railroads, and
local governments operating thousands of microwave communication
links, but they also included state public safety operations such as
firefighters, police, and other emergency responders. 6 0 The auction and
clearing proposals faced resistance and, echoing today's objections from
federal agencies, public safety incumbents warned that the FCC's auction
would disrupt their communications reliability and could "have a
devastating effect on . . . millions of inhabitants" relying on their
services. 61 Nevertheless, the auctions for this encumbered spectrum
62commenced in 1995. The auction winners could deploy services where
there were no incumbents and had secondary rights to the spectrum where
incumbents operated.
[25] To relocate those incumbents and to free up spectrum for PCS, the
FCC mandated that the PCS license winners pay the incumbents'
relocation costs. But the FCC also did something novel: it gave the
incumbent users transferable spectrum rights. That is, the FCC permitted
the incumbent users to bargain with the overlay auction winners and, in
exchange for an additional payment or in-kind benefit, move before a
relocation deadline.6 3
60 See Cramton et al., supra note 56, at 660, 668.
61 REPLY COMMENTS OF THE Los ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT., IN THE MATTER OF
REDEVELOPMENT OF SPECTRUM TO ENCOURAGE INNOVATION IN THE USE OF NEW
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, ET DOCKET No. 92-9 (July 6, 1994), at 2,
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id= 1320380001, archived at
https://perma.cc/ZHM2-STQF.
62 See Cramton et al., supra note 56, at 660-61 (FCC rulemaking for the auction
commenced in 1993, and the PCS auctions were carried out in 1995, 1996, and 1997).
63 See id. at 668-69 ("[T]here have been reports of incumbents demanding premiums of
several times actual relocation costs to relocate before the involuntary relocation
period.").
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[26] The FCC gave non-public safety users a two-year voluntary
negotiation period during which they were not required to negotiate with
the PCS overlay winners.64 This period was followed by a one-year
mandatory negotiation period during which the PCS licensee and the
incumbent were required to bargain in good faith.6 5 After that deadline
three years from commencement-PCS licensees could force the
incumbent to move, while compensating it for relocation costs. Public
safety users had a three-year voluntary negotiation period followed by a
two-year mandatory negotiation period.66
[27] This PCS auction grossed $7.7 billion in bids.6 7 There are no
public records of the payments made for early relocation, but good-faith
negotiations were reportedly the norm.68 By January 1998, over half of the
microwave links had been moved out of the band, 6 9 and the spectrum was
deployed for cellular service. Most incumbent microwave links were
upgraded to work on new frequencies, but about 10% shifted to wired
connections or ceased operation. 7 0 Today PCS spectrum supplies about
2 0% of all licensed spectrum used for mobile broadband and is a major
part of each national carrier's spectrum holdings.7 Looking back, the
64 See id. at 663, 666 (noting that in 1997, this voluntary period was shortened to one
year).
65 See id. at 665-66.
66 See Cramton et al., supra note 56, at 665-66 (noting these negotiation periods and
conditions were occasionally fine-tuned by the FCC.).
67 Evan R. Kwerel & Gregory L. Rosston, An Insiders' View ofFCC Spectrum Auctions,
17 J. REG. ECON. 253, 275 (2000).
68 See Cramton et al., supra note 56, at 668.
69 See id.
7o See id.
71 See FEDERAL COMMC'N COMMISSION, SEVENTEENTH REPORT, IN MATTER OF ANNUAL
REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE MARKET CONDITIONS WITH RESPECT TO
MOBILE WIRELESS, INCLUDING COMMERCIAL MOBILE SERVICES 50, WT DOCKET No. 13-
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concerns about widespread public safety communications disruption never
materialized.
2. Case Study of AWS-1
[28] The 2006 Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-1) auction was an
auction of 90 MHz of paired (45 MHz) spectrum that contained nonfederal
'72and federal users. The nonfederal spectrum was auctioned off via
overlay licenses; the federal spectrum wasn't. Post auction, 12 federal
agencies in the 1.7 GHz band 73 relocated to other bands and several
nonfederal users in the 2.1 GHz band relocated. The nonfederal users
included various state and commercial microwave systems, as well as
Broadband Radio Service systems-which provided services like two-way
broadband and public safety communications.74
135 (2014), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-14-1862A1.pdf, archived
at https://perma.cc/3YVY-3HAW (estimating there is about 580 MHz of spectrum used
for mobile broadband and 120 MHz (PCS spectrum) out of 580 MHz is a little over
20%.).
72 See Rosston, supra note 5, at 235-36 ("The Commission adopted procedures by which
new AWS licensees may relocate incumbent [nonfederal] BRS and fixed microwave
service operations in a manner similar to that developed for clearing the PCS band."); see
also Hazlett & Leo, supra note 45, at 1072.
73 See U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, NTIA, RELOCATION OF FEDERAL RADIO SYSTEMS
FROM THE 1710-1755 MHz SPECTRUM BAND, SECOND ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 2
(Mar. 2009),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/osmhome/reports/Final2ndAnnualRelocationReport2009
0416.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/8CD9-UWJT (listing those agencies: Department
of Agriculture, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department
of the Interior, the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation, the
Department of the Treasury, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the
Tennessee Valley Authority, and the United States Postal Service).
7 4 See FCC, NINTH REPORT AND ORDER AND ORDER IN THE MATTER OF SERVICE RULES
FOR ADVANCED WIRELESS SERVICES IN THE 1.7 GHz AND 2.1 GHz BANDS 5, WT
DOCKET No. 02-352 (Apr. 21, 2006),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatchl/FCC-06-45A1.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/B9VD-2SHR.
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[29] The federal users had a clearing deadline with no direct
compensation from winning bidders. However, federal users received
some indirect compensation. AWS-1 was the first band auctioned under
the 2004 Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act, a law giving federal
agencies a limited share of pooled auction proceeds-compensation for
their relocation costs.75 The 45 MHz occupied by nonfederal users, on the
other hand, was assigned via an overlay license. The FCC permitted the
nonfederal incumbents-much like the incumbents in the PCS bands-to
enter into private cost-sharing agreements with the new AWS licensees.7 6
Despite the encumbrances, the 1.7 GHz band grossed almost $7 billion.
Like the agreements between overlay licensees and incumbents in the PCS
auction, the post-auction cost-sharing agreements relocating the
nonfederal incumbents in the 2.1 GHz band are unavailable.
[30] The federal users did not have overlay licensees to bargain with
and merely faced relocation deadlines. NTIA tracked the relocation costs
of federal systems in the 1.7 GHz band so that agencies could be
reimbursed through the relocation fund created by the Commercial
Spectrum Enhancement Act.7 8 The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) estimated that the encumbered 1.7 GHz band grossed almost $7
billion. 7 9 Relocation costs of federal users totaled around $1.5 billionso ($1
See 47 U.S.C. § 928(c) (2012).
76 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 27.1160; 27.1170 (2015).
7 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-472, SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT:
FEDERAL RELOCATION COSTS AND AUCTION REVENUES 16 (2013),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654794.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/N5N9-D692.
78 See id. at 15-16.
79 See id. at 16.
so See Howard Buskirk, NTIA Says Cost of Clearing A WS Spectrum Will Be Below $1
Billion, COMM. DAILY (Dec. 29, 2005),
www.communicationsdaily.com/articleview?s=73088&id=273162, archived at
20
Volume XXII, Issue 2
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
billion less than a Congressional Budget Office estimate but exceeding
NTIA's original estimates by about 50 percent),81 for net revenue of $5.5
billion.
[31] Once the auction was completed, even though little financial
incentive was provided beyond the benefit of upgraded wireless systems,
the clearing of agencies happened fairly rapidly. Presumably, overlay
licensees paying agencies to relocate would be even more effective. By
December 2008, two years after the auction, dozens of federal wireless
systems had been moved from the 1.7 GHz band, and licensees had
deployed mobile broadband in some cities. 82 Four agencies-the
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland Security, the
US Postal Service, and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development-had vacated the band completely. 8 3 By late 2010, four
years after the completion of the auction, seven agencies representing 810%
of eligible systems had been relocated. 8 4 By 2011, 95% of systems were
https://perma.cc/E7G9-RNRX (Estimates for relocation costs and for upgrading
technologies like outdated analog surveillance systems varied widely before the auction.
On the low end, NTIA projected in a report that the cost of 2,240 frequency assignments
across 12 agencies would be $936 million. In 2005, the Congressional Budget Office
estimated that costs could run as high as $2.5 billion. Agencies included the Department
of Defense (mostly the Navy), Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security,
and Federal Aviation Administration. The Forestry Service had 579 assignments and the
Department of Energy had 596.).
s' See GAO, supra note 75, at 11-12; see generally U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, NTIA,
RELOCATION OF FEDERAL RADIO SYSTEMS FROM THE 1710-1755 MHz SPECTRUM BAND,
SIXTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 2-3 (Mar. 2013) [hereinafter NTIA RELOCATION],
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/sixth annualreport 1710-
1755_mhz_04042013.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/CEE2-V5CM (estimating
relocation costs set by the NTIA and Dep't of Commerce).
82 See NTIA RELOCATION, supra note 79, at 1.
8 3 Id. at 2.
84 See U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, NTIA, RELOCATION OF FEDERAL RADIO SYSTEMS
FROM THE 1710-1755 MHz SPECTRUM BAND, FOURTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 2
(Mar. 2011) [hereinafter NTIA RELOCATION FOURTH],
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relocated,8 5 and by 2012, six years after the auction, NTIA reported that
all seven agencies had ceased operations in the band. 86
[32] Representatives from the wireless industry expressed publicly that
they were satisfied with the relocation process, but some systems and
agencies were more difficult. 8 Representatives from MetroPCS, the
fourth-biggest bidder in the auction, with licenses mostly in the West and
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/1710-1755mhzcseareport 03 3 0 2 0 1 1 .pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/63NR-U9WS.
5See U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, NTIA, RELOCATION OF FEDERAL RADIO SYSTEMS
FROM THE 1710-1755 MHz SPECTRUM BAND, FIFTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 2 (Mar.
2012) [hereinafter NTIA RELOCATION FIFTH],
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/fifthannual-report_1710-
1755mhz_03302012.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/A6MB-3R62.
86 See NTIA RELOCATION FOURTH, supra note 82, at 2-3; see also NTIA RELOCATION
FIFTH, supra note 85, at B-Il (The types of federal wireless systems varied widely in
terms of services and relocation costs. The Department of Housing and Urban
Development had only five systems, for instance, that transmitted video and
communications. The total relocation costs were around $21,000.); Id. at B-14 (The
Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives likewise
had five systems (mostly for video communications), but it had many more components,
and the estimated relocation outlays totaled over $48 million); Id. at B-16 (The Drug
Enforcement Agency had a single system, identified only as "video surveillance," that
was estimated to take three years and $75 million to relocate.); Id. at B-21 (The U.S.
Postal Service also had a single video surveillance system consisting of about 500
devices that took one year and $1.8 million to relocate.).
7See DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMENTS OF T-MOBILE IN THE MATTER OF RELOCATION
OF FEDERAL SYSTEMS IN THE 1710-1755 MHz FREQUENCY BAND: REVIEW OF THE
INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMERCIAL SPECTRUM ENHANCEMENT ACT 1, 5,
DOCKET. No. 0906231085-91085-01 (Aug. 21, 2009),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/t-mobilecseanoicomments_8-21-09_0.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/N5EL-2DZQ (supporting the idea that some regions were
difficult to clear, T-Mobile representatives noted in 2009 to NTIA that "T-Mobile's
launch of service in the AWS band was delayed by several months, if not longer, in many
markets. Indeed, even today-nearly three years after Auction No. 66-there are certain
parts of the country such as the southeast w [h]ere no wireless carrier has been given
access to AWS frequencies. Such delays jeopardize investment, hinder broadband
deployment, and harm consumers").
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the Northeast, stated that the relocation process "worked relatively well."88
Carriers' discussions with agencies about information like channel
bandwidth, antenna power, and height for each system to be relocated
expedited the process. 89 Steve Sharkey, T-Mobile's chief of engineering
and technology policy, said that these technical discussions with federal
users "resulted in T-Mobile being able to deploy services years earlier
than originally anticipated." 90
[33] Clearing federal agencies and allowing nonfederal incumbents to
bargain with the overlay licensees allowed productive use of much of the
encumbered AWS-1 bands within a few years. T-Mobile was the top
bidder, paying over $4 billion for AWS-1 licenses covering nearly the
entire United States, 91 and illustrating the efficacy of overlays and
" DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMENTS OF METROPCS, IN THE MATTER OF RELOCATION OF
FEDERAL SYSTEMS OF 1710-1755 MHz FREQUENCY BAND: REVIEW OF THE INITIAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMERCIAL SPECTRUM ENHANCEMENT ACT 2, DOCKET No.
0906231085-91085-01 (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/metropcs_-
comments on ntia csea notice84803305_5_0.doc, archived at https://perma.cc/2EBV-
MEGV.
8 See COMMENTS OF T-MOBILE, supra note 87, at 5.
90 Creating Opportunities Through Improved Government Spectrum Efficiency: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Comm'n & Tech. ofH. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th
Cong. 6 (2012) (statement of Steve Sharkey, Director, Chief Engineering & Tech. Policy,
T-Mobile USA, Inc.); Howard Buskirk, Spectrum Shortfall Tops Concerns at CTIA, But
Signs Growing Carriers Might Embrace Sharing, COMM. DAILY (May 11, 2012) ("'I
think we're at the point of let's get engineers into a room to figure out and solve the
problems,' [Sharkey] said. 'Neither side has a complete understanding of the way each
other's systems work and operate.' During AWS-1 clearance when industry first tried to
clear spectrum on the West Coast, the immediate reaction of government users was 'no
way, it's all redlined out and it'll be a long time,' [Sharkey] said. 'But we gave them
more information about how our systems really operate and the power levels that they
would expect-it cleared up practically a whole coast almost immediately."').
91 See Press Release, T-Mobile USA, Statement on the Conclusion of Bidding in the FCC
Auction of Advanced Wireless Services (Sept. 18, 2006), https://newsroom.t-
mobile.com/news/t-mobile-usa-statement-on-conclusion-of-bidding-in-the-fcc-auction-
of-advanced-wireless-services.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/8YW6-5LDP.
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clearing. A mere two years after the auction, T-Mobile-after the clearing
of federal users and negotiating with nonfederal incumbents-launched
3G service in 27 markets covering over 100 million people.9 2 This
included the lucrative San Francisco 9 3 and New York City 9 4 markets. By
2010, it completed most of its nationwide mobile broadband network
using AWS-1 spectrum. Auction winners like MetroPCS and Leap
Wireless covered millions more after clearing their AWS-1 spectrum. 9 5
Today that 90 MHz of AWS-1 spectrum, now cleared of incumbents,
supplies about 15% of licensed mobile broadband spectrum and is used by
more than 200 million Americans through technologies such as 4G LTE.96
IV. COMPARISON OF DYNAMIC SHARING AND OVERLAY AUCTIONS
[34] Decades of assigning spectrum to agencies for free has locked
valuable frequencies into inefficient wireless uses. Choosing the superior
set of policies for repurposing federal spectrum in a timely manner means
capturing tens of billions of dollars annually-from consumer welfare
gains, industry investment, and jobs-that would otherwise evaporate. 97
The experiences described suggest that clearing and relocating federal
92 See GLOBAL VIEW PARTNERS, MOBILE BROADBAND IN THE AMERICAS: MOMENTUM
BUILDING IN THE AWS BAND 14 (2009), http://www.gsma.com/latinamerica/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/momentumbuildingintheawsbandreport.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/8QNQ-PH4B.
93 See COMMENTS OF T-MOBILE, supra note 87, at 6.
94 See Katherine Noyes, T-Mo bile's 3G Network Touches Down in NYC,
TECHNEWSWORLD (May 5, 2008), http://www.technewsworld.com/story/62876.html,
archived at https://perma.cc/YH3B-YHJZ.
95 See GLOBAL VIEW PARTNERS, supra note 92, at 14-15.
96 See FCC, supra note 69, at 50, 62 (showing that the 90 MHz of cleared AWS-1
spectrum constitutes around 15.5% of the total amount (580.5 MHz) of spectrum).
97 See BAZELON & MCHENRY, supra note 8, at 13 (attachment A) (discussing the
economic costs of delay in the TV broadcaster incentive auction).
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systems through a system of overlay auctions yield greater economic
benefit than do dynamic sharing proposals like the one contemplated by
PCAST.
[35] Direct comparison of unlicensed dynamic sharing with overlays is
difficult because, as mentioned, dynamic sharing technologies do not have
widespread deployment. This is a red flag given the substantial costs for
every year that implementation is delayed. NTIA has proposed the use of
dynamic sharing strategies since at least 1991.98 But to date these
technologies have permitted very little sharing between commercial and
government users. 99 The PCAST authors are aware of some of these
difficulties and therefore predict that its proposed overhaul of policy
would take "perhaps two to three decades."100
[36] That prediction is a best-case scenario. It would likely take much
longer to implement a widespread complex sharing regime. Even if it
becomes technically feasible to share spectrum across a wide band of
frequencies in real time, the regulatory process either halts or substantially
delays inter-organization sharing. 101 The unlicensed sharing approach
shifts the tasks of devising certifications and regulating spectrum-sharing
etiquette from market actors to regulators. 102 Nearly all wireless operators,
including government agencies and commercial licensees, vigorously
resist sharing spectrum with other users and technologies. There have been
98 See NTIA, U.S. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT POLICY: AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 6 (1991),
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1998/us-spectrum-management-policy-agenda-
future#ch3, archived at https://perma.cc/J4T9-SEMS.
99 See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Commentary on "The Spectrum Opportunity: Sharing as the
Solution to the Wireless Crunch, " 8 INT'L J. COMM. 116, 119 (2014).
100 PCAST, supra note 21, at v, ix.
101 See Thomas W. Hazlett & Brent Skorup, Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons:
LightSquared and the Missing Spectrum Rights, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 21 (2014).
102 See Jerry Brito, The Spectrum Commons in Theory and Practice, 2007 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1, P36-37, P54 (2007).
25
Volume XXII, Issue 2
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
costly episodes of agencies and licensees fiercely objecting to even minute
- * *103possibilities of interference to their own wireless operations.
[37] The multitude of federal systems with vastly different performance
characteristics-radar, satellite communications, air-to-ground
communications, video surveillance, unmanned aircraft systems, to name
a few-means that the complex challenges for consumer device makers
are multiplied. No amount of engineering ingenuity can tell regulators
what the "correct" probability of harmful radio interference is. In sharing
disputes, the incumbents invariably commission technical analyses that
highlight remote, worst-case interference scenarios. The entrants respond
with their own studies showing "typical" scenarios in which their systems
pose little interference threat to existing users. Regulators are caught in the
middle of a tug-of-war of competing technical papers and have no
propensity to make a decision that optimizes wireless output between the
systems. Even after a decision is made to allow shared use, a federal
system technology upgrade or a change in federal supplier could simply
restart the process anew (at best) or stymie necessary and life-saving
agency upgrades (at worst).
[38] Incumbents present delays and resistance toward any scheme.
However, overlays and clearing have an established history of delivering
spectrum to private markets, where millions of subscribers can use it
productively in a few years' time. It is too early to say, as the PCAST
report intimates, that clearing federal users is impractical. 10 4 As the PCS
103 See, e.g., Hazlett & Skorup, supra note 99, at 3-4 (discussing the LightSquared-GPS
dispute); Examination of the Government's Spectrum Management Process: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and the Internet ofH. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 107th Cong. 42-43 (2002), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
107hhrg80674/pdf/CHRG-107hhrg80674.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/UUC4-K5A6
(Ultrawideband (UWB) users struggled for more than a decade to coordinate with federal
users, NTIA, and the FCC to share spectrum: "It took 13 years, including three and one
half years of intensive efforts, to gain regulatory approval for UWB."); Brito, supra note
100, at P64 (describing how satellite incumbents objected to the FCC's exclusion zone
sizes when permitting unlicensed devices).
104 PCAST Report, supra note 21, at 1.
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and AWS-1 examples show, much of the spectrum cleared by overlay
auctions and clearing deadlines is typically redeployed commercially in
under five years. o0
[39] By giving agencies greater rights to their spectrum and a
mechanism-overlay auctions-that allows the agencies to transfer those
rights and to retain revenues, federal spectrum could be repurposed for
consumer uses. Overlay auctions have been completed before and
represent an off-the-shelf technique that FCC staff members have
experience implementing.10 6 Overlays present great flexibility in auction
design because licenses can be nationwide, regional, or can cover narrow
geographic locations. Importantly, overlays rationalize band usage by
creating residual claimants who internalize the gain from spectrum
investments. 10 7 When an overlay licensee moves an agency to another
band or medium, its spectrum is more valuable. It is this increase in value
that gives the parties room to negotiate.
1os The PCS auctions took place from 1995 to 1997. See Cramton et al., supra note 56, at
660-61. Sprint was the largest bidders and by the end of 1996 had already deployed PCS
operations in several major markets, including Washington, D.C. and San Diego, with
planned deployments in several more markets by mid-1997. Press Release, Qualcomm,
Sprint PCS Launches Advanced Wireless Service in San Diego (Dec. 27, 1996),
https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/1996/12/27/sprint-pcs-launches-advanced-
wireless-service-san-diego, archived at https://perma.cc/3G2M-XG7Y. T-Mobile was the
largest bidder in the 2006 AWS-1 auction and by the end of 2008 had deployed 3G
networks that covered over 100 million Americans by using AWS-1 bands. See GLOBAL
VIEW PARTNERS, supra note 92.
106 Overlay auctions include the PCS and AWS-1 auctions described supra, as well as
smaller auctions like the BRS auction. See Cramton et al., supra note 56, at 660-61;
Rosston, supra note 5, at 235-36.
107 See Hazlett, supra note 22, at 18 ("Overlay licenses empower private [decision]
agents, who internalize substantial gains [from spectrum reassignment] .. .These actors
not only have superior information and incentives to those of government administrators .
. but they bring a different tool kit to the task at hand. In particular, private firms can
write contracts and access capital markets.").
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[40] After 25 years of forecasts that dynamic sharing is right around the
corner, dynamic sharing is still largely in the research and development
stage. 108 Dynamic sharing depends on complex cognitive radios or central
database look-up functions that may never be deployed en masse. Despite
access to some 240 MHz of prime spectrum, only 600 or so unlicensed
devices in the market use TV white spaces, utilizing a crude sharing
technology. 109 I am not aware of any reliable estimates, but the total
investment in the white space ecosystem seven years after its 2008
allocation likely totals only a few million dollars and attracts only a few
thousand users.
[41] In contrast, clearing incumbents with overlays in similar swaths of
spectrum leads to investment and consumer welfare gains orders of
magnitude larger, sometimes within months of auction. Hazlett et al.
estimated in 2004 that the repurposing of 120 MHz of spectrum for PCS
induced over $45 billion of network investment in the five-year period
following the auction, from 1994 to 1998.110 The 220 MHz of spectrum
freed by the combined broadband PCS and AWS-1 auctions supplies
about one-third of spectrum holdings of mobile carriers, 1 an essential
1os See GAO, supra note 77, at 24; Paul Barbagallo, For TV "FWhite Spaces," the Global
Outlook is Hopeful but Cautious, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 16, 2014),
http://www.bna.com/tv-white-spaces-nl7179892333/, archived at
https://perma.cc/CXM4-VFRX (noting that "spectrum sensing, is still nascent").
109 See McDowell, supra note 47.
110 THOMAS W. HAZLETT ET AL., REPORT TO U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, SENDING THE
RIGHT SIGNALS: PROMOTING COMPETITION THROUGH TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM 1,
103 (Sept. 2004),
http://www.mtledgecapital.com/pdf files/20041006telecomderegcompletestudy.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/4M2N-FJ97.
111 FCC, supra note 69, at 50 (estimating that there is about 580 MHz of spectrum used
for mobile broadband).
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input for an industry that in 2014 had revenues of nearly $188 billion and
capital investment of $32 billion. 1 12
[42] Dynamic sharing technology simply will not enable similar
economic benefits in the next several years. Given the tremendous
opportunity costs of inaction in the interim, waiting for dynamic
technology to be widespread is a speculative and costly option relative to
clearing alternatives. 1 13
V. FINAL NOTES
A. Response to the Counter that Federal Agencies May Not
Respond to Financial Incentives
[43] Some scholars argue that giving agencies self-funding ability
through transferable spectrum rights would be ineffective. 1 14 They counter
112 CTIA, Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA.ORG (2015), http://www.ctia.org/your-
wireless-life/how-wireless-works/annual-wireless-industry -survey, archived at
https://perma.cc/L48C-ZL9X.
113 Regulators in the recent past ignored the huge consumer welfare losses that delay
inflicts. See Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect ofRegulation on New Services in
Telecommunications, 28 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1,
24 (1997), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Projects/BPEA/1997-
micro/1997_bpeamicro_hausman.PDF, archived at https://perma.cc/2TE2-MQUF ("It
appears that delay in cellular service was the commission's way to avoid confronting a
very difficult decision. Potential losses in consumer welfare did not appear to figure into
the FCC's regulatory approach.").
114 See, e.g., THOMAS LENARD & LAWRENCE WHITE, DIGITAL AGE COMMUNICATIONS
ACT: REPORT FROM THE NEW SPECTRUM POLICY WORKING GROUP, TECH. POL'Y INST. 1,
20 (Mar. 2006), http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/060309dacaspectruml.O.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/S7H9-TYNP; DOROTHY ROBYN, MAKING WAVES:
ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO FLEXIBLE USE SPECTRUM, ASPEN INST. 1, 36 (2015),
http://csreports.aspeninstitute.org/documents/Spectrum MakingWaves.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/TL4Y-5WVR ("[The argument against transferable federal spectrum
rights] that has gotten the most traction in the spectrum community-is that the ability to
retain the proceeds will not motivate federal agencies to transfer their spectrum because
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that any gain in revenue from spectrum sales would be viewed by
Congress as a windfall and would be offset in subsequent rounds of
appropriations, thereby diminishing the incentive of agencies to sell their
spectrum.1 15
[44] The logic is sensible, but existing evidence appears to undermine
that theory. Admittedly, the literature on agency self-funding is limited, 1 16
and literature on the incentive effects from agency self-funding through
asset sales is even scarcer. Therefore, predictions about how Congress and
agencies will respond to the vestment of additional spectrum rights are
largely conjectural. However, existing programs indicate that agencies (1)
do not generally believe they will be penalized in the appropriations
process for perceived windfalls from asset sales and (2) can be
incentivized to relinquish property if they can pocket some of the gains.
[45] The examples where agencies self-fund indicate that agencies
favor such arrangements, provided that they have significant control over
distributing the revenue. 11 For instance, GAO analysis of financial
regulatory agencies that self-fund through examination fees and the like
indicates that self-funded agencies generally prefer self-funding to funding
through the appropriations process."
of the nature of the budget process . . .. In anticipation of this zero-sum dynamic,
agencies would forego the opportunity to trade spectrum for money.").
115 See Robyn, supra note 114, at 42.
116 See Charles Kruly, Self-Funding and Agency Independence, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1733, 1737 (2013).
117 U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-864, SEC OPERATIONS:
IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE FUNDING STRUCTURES 11-12 (2002),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02864.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/7246-JD69.
11s See id. at 12-13 (stating that, if self-funding agencies in fact do receive more punitive
scrutiny from Congress, the drawbacks are likely diminished in the case of spectrum
sales, where agencies are merely supplementing their budgets. Presumably, Congress is
more likely to scrutinize totally self-funded agencies than partially self-funded agencies).
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[46] More to the point, in responding to the notion that Congress will
penalize agencies for monetary windfalls provided by asset sales, Dorothy
Robyn-who was in an excellent position to view such dynamics while at
the General Services Administration and the Department of Defense-
concluded in her influential spectrum policy paper, "[t]hat has
emphatically not been my experience."1 19 Robyn points out that it was the
agencies themselves that lobbied Congress for agency retention of revenue
from land sales during a round of painful military base closures. 120 These
sales can occasionally be quite large. The Navy, for instance, sold two
Marine Corps bases for $850 million 21 -likely substantial enough to
receive congressional notice-but there is no evidence the Navy saw
decreased appropriations as a result.
[47] Further, Congress authorizes the secretaries of the military
departments to lease underused real property and personal property that
the department controls in exchange for cash and in-kind consideration. 122
The military has used that authority to enter into complex leases, called
enhanced use leases, which might grant, for example, a 50-year lease of
military land to a private developer. 12 3 A 2011 GAO report noted that
there were 17 enhanced use leases in place, with in-kind consideration
valued at hundreds of millions of dollars, and dozens more were either
119 Robyn, supra note 12, at 14.
120 See id.
121 See Robyn, supra note 114, at 37.
122 See 10 U.S.C. § 2667(a) (2012); T. Randolph Beard et al., Market Mechanisms and
the Efficient Use and Management ofScarce Spectrum Resources, 66 FED. CoMM. L.J.
263, 291 (2013) (stating that leasing spectrum has been proposed, but the government's
inefficient management of spectrum leads scholars to conclude that it is preferable for
agencies to sell spectrum rather than to lease it).
123 See GAO, supra note 55, at 2, 8 (stating that these leases often include revenue
sharing between the private developer and the agency).
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under review or in negotiation. 124 On the basis of agency use of these
programs, Robyn concluded "the ability to retain the proceeds from the
disposal of property is a key motivator for federal agencies."125
[48] There are risks, such as improper incentives and decreased
accountability to Congress and to the president, when agencies self-
fund. 126 Self-funding programs should be monitored and perhaps have
mandatory sunsets, but there is some real-world evidence that allowing
agencies to retain some proceeds of asset sales motivates the types of
behaviors intended-namely, disposition of underused public assets into
private markets, where the assets can be used more productively.
B. Need for Mandatory Clearing Deadlines for Federal Users
after an Overlay Auction
[49] One lesson from the PCS overlay auction, identified by Cramton,
Kwerel, and Williams, was that relocating state government systems was
significantly slowed when the agencies were permitted to stay
indefinitely. 127 Such delays led the scholars to conclude that, in fact,
government agencies may need weaker rights to stay than do
nongovernment incumbents "because they [government users] may be too
likely to stay when they should terminate or relocate."128
[50] Absent a deadline, economically efficient improvements tend to be
underproduced or substantially delayed because incumbents have an
124 See id. at 2.
125 Robyn, supra note 12, at 14.
126 See Kruly, supra note 116, at 1737.
127 See Cramton et al., supra note 56, at 664-65.
128 Id. at 665.
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incentive to reject the bidder's offers indefinitely. 129 Incumbents know that
their consent is required and that they can extract a portion of the producer
surplus in excess of their opportunity costs-the so-called holdout
problem. 130 This problem is likely exacerbated when public agencies are
involved. Further, for an appreciating asset like spectrum, hoarding may
be a lucrative strategy.131
[51] The benefit of a deadline to move wireless systems is that
negotiations focus on the relocation costs (with a premium paid for speedy
132relocation) and not on the value to the entrant of clearing the spectrum.
Incumbent users thus have an incentive to settle early. 133 In the broadband
PCS and AWS-1 auctions involving federal and nonfederal incumbents,
deadlines helped make relocations largely successful in encouraging
positive-sum settlements. 134
C. Role of Political Entrepreneurship in Spectrum
Reallocation
[52] Overlay licenses of encumbered federal spectrum would represent
uncertain investments with substantial risk discounting, so economic
modeling is challenging. Information about many defense and law
enforcement systems is difficult to acquire and stymies bargaining
between commercial bidders and agencies. Hence, knowledgeable former
129 See generally Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1991),
https://web2.uconn.edu/ciom/Cohen.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/NX7N-NUJX.
130 See Glen Whitman, Law & Economics Lecture 2: Externalities, CAL. ST. UNIV.
NORTHRIDGE, http://www.csun.edu/-dgw61315/L&Elect2.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/NPN7-WSNR (last visited Jan. 27, 2016).
131 See Robyn, supra note 114, at 35.
132 See Cramton et al., supra note 56, at 649-50.
133 See id. at 658.
134 See id. at 649.
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federal officials will likely need to use their expertise to make deals
possible between agencies and commercial bidders.
[53] Such political entrepreneurship has a storied history in spectrum
allocation. In the 1980s and 1990s a former wireless regulator at the FCC,
acquired wireless licenses held by taxi and pizza delivery dispatchers. 1 3 5
The FCC agreed to waive rules regarding the licenses, and the purchaser
aggregated the new, flexible licenses that enabled cellular phone
technology. 136 His actions increased the economic value of those
fragmented licenses and led to the creation of Nextel, which was one of
the nation's largest mobile phone companies when it was acquired by
Sprint. 137
[54] Since 2000, following the financial failures of several satellite
communications operators, the FCC has waived rules requiring satellite
communications in certain bands so that the same spectrum can be used
instead for ground-based cellular mobile broadband. In the mid-2000s,
though they were less successful at navigating the regulatory issues than
was O'Brien, financier Phil Falcone and his business partners acquired
spectrum licensed to satellite communications firms SkyTerra and
Inmarsat. They devoted billions of dollars to developing a new wireless
network. 1 3 8 The company, LightSquared, petitioned the government for
waivers, and the FCC agreed to loosen its rules to permit traditional
mobile phone service in that spectrum.139 Likewise, in 2011 Dish Network
135 See Thomas W. Hazlett, Inching Toward Wireless Capitalism, WALL STREET J.
EUROPE (Jan. 12, 2004),
http://mason.gmu.edu/-thazlett/opeds/Inching%/"2OToward%/"2OWireless%/"2OCapitalism.p
df, archived at https://perma.cc/MZ5V-Q3TK.
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See Daniel Fisher, Lightscrewed, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2012/0116/feature-phil-falcone-gps-senator-grassley-
communication-commission.html, archived at https://perma.cc/8HD8-LEWD.
139 See id.
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acquired 40 MHz of satellite spectrum through a fire sale purchase of two
bankrupt satellite communications companies. 1 4 0 The FCC again waived
most of its satellite rules and permitted traditional mobile broadband
services.
[55] Finally, most relevantly, in the AWS-1 auction, T-Mobile hired
defense experts, including a former general and former director of the
Defense Information Systems agency, to assist in negotiating with federal
agency heads. 141 Successful political entrepreneurship requires
institutional knowledge of federal systems and of the idiosyncratic
personalities and hierarchies that may otherwise confound successful
transactions. 142 Political entrepreneurship is difficult to identify and to
model formally, but it will likely play an important role if agencies are
vested with spectrum rights that they can transfer for payment.
140 See FCC, REPORT AND ORDER AND ORDER OF PROPOSED MODIFICATION IN THE
MATTER OF SERVICE RULES FOR ADVANCED WIRELESS SERVICES IN THE 2000-2020 MHz
AND 2180-2200 MHz BANDS, WT DOCKET. No. 12-70, 2, 8 (Dec. 11, 2012),
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily Releases/Daily Business/2012/dbl218/FCC-12-
15 1A 1.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/4V8C-2QBR.
141 T-Mobile Lobbies on Wireless Airwaves (Dec. 12, 2007), YAHOO!,
http://web.archive.org/web/20071217213319/http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/071212/t mobile_1
obbying.html?.v= 1, archived at https://perma.cc/8T9A-USHY. T-Mobile's lobbyists
included those at the Cohen Group, headed by former Clinton defense secretary William
Cohen. Id.
142 Political entrepreneurship admittedly resembles and likely overlaps with the notorious
revolving door phenomenon in politics. It is beyond the purposes of this paper to
distinguish between damaging rent-seeking and socially beneficial deal-making. Suffice
it to say that in some circumstances former insiders, possessing a depth of knowledge that
disinterested outsiders cannot reasonably attain, can effect Pareto improvements in
regulated industries. The analysis presented supra suggests that Pareto improvements
here are fairly easy to identify-it is likely that most transfers of spectrum from agencies
to the private sector result in substantial social welfare gains. See also BAZELON &
MCHENRY, supra note 8, at 9 (citing economics research that suggests the consumer
benefits generated by spectrum deployed for wireless broadband are 10 to 20 times the
value of the spectrum to producers).
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VI. CONCLUSION
[56] Overlay auctions are one of several tools policymakers should
consider for repurposing federal spectrum. There are several plans for
approaching the problem of inefficient government use, but all, to various
degrees, are time consuming and costly. If overlays and clearing deadlines
are time consuming because relocations typically take two to six years,
what does that imply for PCAST-style unlicensed dynamic sharing that
take decades to fully implement? No other reform proposal has enabled
widespread consumer use and economic investment as rapidly as have
overlay auctions combined with clearing deadlines. Federal agencies lack
some of the incentives that private firms have to use resources efficiently.
Nevertheless, when spectrum users have the ability to sell their rights and
overlay auctions are used, experience suggests that spectrum can be
repurposed from legacy government systems to high-value commercial
uses within a few years.
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